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DYNAMIC FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Andrew S. Gold'
This Article assesses a fundamental puzzle concerning directors'fiduciary
duties. While courts have gradually refined the content of fiduciary duties,
they have yet to determine which parties are the beneficiaries of these duties.
In the standard Delaware pronouncement, directors owe their duties to "the
corporation and its shareholders." Since the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders will diverge in various settings, this is at best an
indeterminate legal doctrine. The puzzle is that this indeterminacy remains
an ongoing feature of the law, rather than a temporary area of uncertainty.
Why don't the courts pick just the shareholders, or just the corporation?
In order to better understand why the courts might select ambiguity, this
Article will focus on the practical effects of the existing doctrine. An
underappreciated feature of the current ambiguity is that it facilitates
dynamic fiduciary duties. The broad range of judicially endorsed beneficiaries
gives directors a variety of legitimate interpretations among which to choose.
Directors are likely to develop their own interpretations of the correct
fiduciary beneficiary from within that range, and these interpretations will
inevitably shift over time. In short, a key feature of fiduciary duties is that
they are read differently across time and between firms.
This dynamism of fiduciary duties might be accounted for in terms of
political convenience, or judicial compromise. But there is another possibility.
This Article will explore whether the uncertainty of fiduciary beneficiaries
could be understood as a desirable legal outcome. Two hypotheses will be
considered. First, it may be that dynamic fiduciary duties follow predictable
patterns, reflecting the allocations of bargaining power among corporate
constituents. This would suggest that directors' fiduciary duties are a
"bargain-mimicking" default rule. Under limited circumstances, this
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hypothesis may be accurate. In the ordinary case, however, a bargain-
mimicking account would likely fail.
Second, dynamic fiduciary duties may provide for variation in outcomes.
This hypothesis is more promising. On this account, dynamic fiduciary duties
may be a way to experiment with legal options-i.e., individualfirms may be
"laboratories of corporate governance." This idea fits well with an
evolutionary account of business strategy. In effect, those firms which adopt
the most efficient fiduciary duties for their circumstances (whether in terms of
a firm's stage of existence, industry, or other features) are more likely to
survive, or succeed in comparison to others. Dynamic fiduciary duties may
then be a means to develop desirable forms of fiduciary duty in a context
where courts, and even boards, are unlikely to come up with these answers on
their own.
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DYNAMIC FIDUCIARY DUTIES
"Unlike ideals of corporate governance, a fiduciary's duties do not
change over time."
- In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative LitigationI
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the above account, directors' fiduciary duties do
change over time. Granted, the basic content of fiduciary duties does not
change very often-the broad meaning of loyalty and care is largely
static. But fiduciary duties still undergo constant revision in a very
important sense: the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties do change, and
they change based on the decisions of the directors themselves.
When we recognize this dynamism, we can better understand an
important but puzzling feature of corporate law: legally speaking, there
is a deep uncertainty as to precisely which parties are the beneficiaries of
directors' fiduciary duties. Courts regularly state that directors' fiduciary
duties are owed to both shareholders and the corporation. 2 Yet it has
long been recognized that shareholders and corporations can have
divergent interests.3 And, to the extent that fiduciary duties are owed to
shareholders in particular, courts tend not to differentiate among
subgroups within the shareholder set. Here, too, interests within the
group will diverge.4 As a consequence, the beneficiaries of director
fiduciary duties are left indeterminate.5
1 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
2 See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del.
2007) ("It is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation
and its shareholders."). For an indication of the ambiguity in Delaware courts' statements on
this topic, see E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a
Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 764 n.8
(2008) (listing cases which describe duties owed to the corporation or to the corporation and its
shareholders). This is not to deny that, in certain limited fact patterns, courts describe a
fiduciary duty in terms of a specific beneficiary. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (describing a duty to maximize shareholder value
when the sale and break-up of the corporation was inevitable).
3 One instance where this may occur is when corporations near insolvency. See Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 297
(1999) (noting that when a corporation approaches insolvency "shareholders' interests can
become a poor proxy for the corporate coalition's interests"). But the two interests differ from
each other, or at least can differ, in other respects as well. See David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 255 (arguing for divergent shareholder and corporate
interests in the takeover setting); cf Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The
Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 645-46 (2006) (indicating that shareholder
wealth is not always a proxy for firm value).
4 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 579-92 (2006) (describing divergent shareholder interests).
5 This indeterminacy is important, at least, if we accept the Delaware courts' current view
that the fiduciary duty of loyalty includes an affirmative duty to act in the best interests of the
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This Article focuses on the outcome of this indeterminacy. By
announcing a duty to multiple beneficiaries (and enforcing the business
judgment rule), courts are allowing directors to select from within a
range of fiduciary beneficiaries.6 That discretion means that fiduciary
duties can have changing beneficiaries, as directors' interpretations of
the appropriate beneficiary shift over time. This dynamic feature
suggests that fiduciary duties will often track changes in the bargaining
power of corporate constituents. More generally, it suggests that
fiduciary duties will have differing beneficiaries across time, and across
firms.
At first glance, a duty to multiple, conflicting beneficiaries may
seem incoherent.7 For this reason, we may think the uncertainty here is
a byproduct of other policy concerns. Courts may have left the
beneficiary question open because they are unsure about the extent to
which shareholder interests coincide with the public good.8
Alternatively, courts may have compromised between competing views
on policy.9 Perhaps the vagueness of legal doctrine is intended to serve
political ends.o This Article suggests an additional way to understand
the beneficiaries puzzle. Vague legal doctrine results in dynamic
shareholders and the corporation. If one instead defined directors' fiduciary duties such that
they only incorporate an anti-self-dealing rule, then the puzzle would be substantially less
significant. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 909 (2011)
("The fiduciary duty to avoid self-dealing is not defined with reference to the specific parties on
whose behalf the fiduciary must act."). That definition, however, is not consistent with existing
law.
6 Cf. Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule:
Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 436 (2007)
("[Corporate] ends themselves are open to different interpretations."). On the effect of the
business judgment rule in this setting, see Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary
Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 247 (2009).
7 Conflicting duties are not, however, unheard of in fiduciary law. See generally Steven L.
Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867 (2010).
8 See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV.
1385, 1449 (2008) ("Corporate law's ambivalence.., regarding beneficiaries ... reflect[s] larger
misgivings about the consistency of shareholders' interests and incentives with those of society
at large."). Courts may also be expressing ambivalence as a result of concerns over prevailing
social norms. See Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life
and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 934 (1990) ("The actions of Delaware's judges on the
takeover front reveal how common-law doctrine ultimately must square with underlying social
norms. Their opinions chronicle a clumsy but fascinating doctrinal expression of ambivalent
social expectations of corporate behavior.").
9 See Bruner, supra note 8, at 1426 (describing this account); see also William T. Allen et
al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1067, 1067 (2002) (describing ambivalence of Delaware corporate law as to whether its
sole aim is to facilitate shareholder economic welfare).
10 Cf. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence, 55 DuKE L.J. 1, 7-8 (2005) (analyzing the fiduciary duty of good faith as a
response by the Delaware courts to an environment of corporate crises).
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fiduciary duties, and this dynamism can be understood as a desirable
feature of corporate law."
In order to make sense of the courts' announcement of vague and
conflicting beneficiaries, we need to understand what this doctrine
accomplishes. By instructing directors to act as fiduciaries to both
shareholders and the corporation, the courts have effectively given
directors leeway to exercise discretion; within limits, they may act as
fiduciaries to the shareholders or the corporation.12 Likewise, by
describing fiduciary duties to shareholders without determining which
categories of shareholders, directors may make the choice themselves.13
Directors have discretion (within a bounded range) to decide which
parties their decisions will serve. 14
This discretion also means that directors can alter their choices
regarding the ends they serve. Nothing stops a director from serving the
shareholders on day one, and then serving the corporation a year later.
Both choices of beneficiary can be understood to fall within the required
range of acceptable fiduciary conduct-the relevant duties being owed
to shareholders and the corporation-but the nature of these duties will
vary with the director's choices. Moreover, as the composition of the
board changes with new director elections, we can anticipate variation
even if individual directors were to remain static in their interpretation
of their responsibilities. In short, directors' fiduciary duties are
inevitably dynamic.15
11 We may conclude that judicial compromise is also a desirable feature of corporate law,
but compromise would be desirable in a different sense. Compromise may be justified in terms
of prudence or in terms of political ends. It is desirable as a way to limit the effects of potential
errors, for example. This Article suggests that the ambiguity of fiduciary beneficiaries can be a
means to help achieve goals such as efficiency or respect for the corporate contract. These
objectives involve a different type of aim from the objectives commonly served by compromise.
12 Note that directors may decide which beneficiaries to favor even if the directors
understand themselves to be acting as fiduciaries to both shareholders and the corporation.
Although this interpretation of fiduciary duties would be distinct from a disjunctive reading of
the judicial language, a substantial dynamism of fiduciary duties would still result.
13 A particularly striking exercise of director discretion may arise where the board falls
under the control of preferred shareholders. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of
Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 992 (2006) ("In any event, Orban
establishes that a preferred-controlled board does not owe a fiduciary duty specifically to the
common shareholders and that it has wide discretion to benefit the preferred shareholders
instead.").
14 A similar point holds if we see the beneficiary as just the corporation. In that case, there
is substantial room to interpret what "the corporation" refers to, and which ends are
"corporate" ends. See Gold, supra note 6, at 436 (noting that directors have some discretion not
only as to the means they choose in obtaining a corporate end, but also as to the ends served);
cf. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 278 (2011)
("[P]articularly where the [fiduciary] authority relates to matters of personality, the fiduciary
may be authorized to determine the ends of the beneficiary.").
15 The vagueness of fiduciary doctrine is not the only basis for this view. We may also tie it
to the broad corporate purpose clauses that corporations generally adopt. Cf. Ernest L. Folk, III,
De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1280 n.80
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This Article will explore two potential justifications for this
dynamism.16 One possibility is that dynamic fiduciary duties will
produce a desirable pattern of director conduct. The dynamism of
fiduciary duties may broadly follow shifts in power among corporate
constituents, updating directors' responsibilities as the corporation
changes. In other words, fiduciary duties may amount to a bargain-
mimicking default. 17
The standard economic account of fiduciary duties is that they are
a majoritarian default, designed to fill gaps in the corporate contract. On
this view, courts attempt to construct a hypothetical bargain based on
the terms which the majority of contracting parties would select ex ante,
in a world of zero transaction costs. 18 Bargain-mimicking defaults follow
a different template. They instead reflect the allocation of bargaining
power among particular contracting parties.
Notably, the dynamism of fiduciary duties need not be random in
its effects-changes in directors' interpretations may follow a pattern.
Over time, different corporate constituents will have different
relationships with the corporation and its board. On the bargain-
mimicking account, the pattern of dynamic fiduciary duties will take
into account these shifts in power among corporate constituents. Given
the incentives directors face, directors' discretion regarding corporate
ends may result in corporate decisions that broadly (if imperfectly)
reflect the current division of bargaining power among the various
constituents of the firm.19
(1963) ("[T~he articles of incorporation may be drafted with an indefinite number and variety
of business 'purposes,' and the directors may decide when they want to change course."). For
recent accounts of broad corporate purpose clauses and their relevance to corporate law, see
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate
Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 740-42 (2006); and Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and Judicial
Uncertainty, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1087, 1106-08 (2012).
16 It should be noted that these justifications are not the only available explanations for the
uncertain doctrine concerning fiduciary beneficiaries. For example, that uncertainty can be
accounted for as the product of judicial ambivalence, pragmatic compromise, or political
strategy. See infra text accompanying notes 48-50. This Article explores the possibility that
dynamic fiduciary duties are desirable legal policy in their own right, rather than a mere
byproduct of other phenomena.
17 See Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
396 (2009).
18 For a helpful account of the hypothetical bargain methodology in the corporate law
setting, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 577-79 (2003).
19 For prior suggestions that director decision-making will respond to allocations of
bargaining power among corporate constituencies, see Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 283
(suggesting that the benefits received by different corporate constituencies "may be driven
more by political power than by economic factors"); and David Millon, New Game Plan or
Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1001, 1027-30 (2000) (suggesting that boards are responsive to the bargaining power of
shareholders). It should be noted that commentators differ on the extent to which this
responsiveness is desirable.
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As we will see, there are reasons to doubt whether this first account
can succeed, at least as a general matter. Bargain-mimicking defaults are
not obviously efficient, and it is at best debatable whether fiduciary
duties are dynamic in a way that will accurately reflect allocations of
bargaining power among corporate constituents. Under limited
circumstances, a bargain-mimicking default may make sense in
describing fiduciary duties, particularly where bargaining power is
lopsided in favor of one party. It is not clear, however, that directors'
fiduciary duties will ordinarily fall into this category.
Yet there is another argument for dynamic fiduciary duties. When
we are faced with long time horizons and substantial uncertainty,
variable outcomes can provide a significant regulatory benefit: they
allow for the discovery of desirable innovations. Dynamic fiduciary
duties produce variance among firms (and within firms across time).
Given a spectrum of fiduciary approaches, markets may select for one
type of fiduciary behavior over another. On this account, more efficient
decisions regarding fiduciary beneficiaries are more likely to survive.
Dynamic fiduciary duties could thus be a useful strategy even if we
remain uncertain about the ideal fiduciary beneficiary.
Part I of this Article describes the dynamism of fiduciary duties.
Part II indicates how dynamic fiduciary duties may function as a
bargain-mimicking default. Part III assesses the potential costs and
benefits of a bargain-mimicking approach to fiduciary duties. This Part
indicates that the merits of such an approach are debatable for ordinary
fact patterns. Part IV provides an evolutionary account of dynamic
fiduciary duties. This Part suggests that the uncertainty surrounding
optimal fiduciary duties may justify the indeterminate doctrine adopted
by the Delaware courts.
I. THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
There are several senses in which corporate fiduciary duties could
be considered dynamic. It is therefore important to distinguish exactly
what kind of dynamism is under discussion in this Article. Courts have
claimed that fiduciary duties are static.20 A contrary claim-that
fiduciary duties actually change-is therefore likely to meet some
resistance, and we will want to be clear about what type of dynamism is
at stake.
20 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d
27 (Del. 2006) ("Unlike ideals of corporate governance, a fiduciary's duties do not change over
time. How we understand those duties may evolve and become refined, but the duties
themselves have not changed, except to the extent that fulfilling a fiduciary duty requires
obedience to other positive law.").
2012]
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Henry Hansmann's work suggests one important sense in which
fiduciary duties are dynamic, even if they appear static at first glance.
From this perspective, fiduciary duties are dynamic as a result of legal
changes imposed by the state. 21 As Hansmann notes, corporate law is
dominated by default rules, rather than mandatory rules.22 Yet, perhaps
ironically, many of these default rules are left in place by corporate
charters. Why should this be so? Hansmann's answer is that default
terms are left in place because the state adjusts the law to take into
account changing circumstances. 23
If we consider amendments to the law to be a part of the corporate
contract, then fiduciary duties are clearly dynamic. Indeed, fiduciary
duties may be dynamic on a regular basis if legal institutions frequently
alter them. From this perspective, fiduciary duties are malleable even if
they remain unchanged in between legislative or judicial amendments.
And, although there is debate about the frequency of such revisions,
many believe that directors' fiduciary duties change as a result of judicial
decisions.24 It is also easy to provide salient examples. The duty of care
was effectively changed pursuant to Smith v. Van Gorkom,25 and a
significant subset of commentators believe that the duty of loyalty was
changed by the recent decision in Stone v. Ritter.26
21 Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2006) ("The
provisions of corporate law are essentially contract terms that can be repeatedly reformed by a
third party-the state-to adapt them to changing circumstances.").
22 See id. at 3 ("[Iun substance, all mandatory terms in state corporate law have now been
eliminated."). Note that, even if we conclude that there are some important mandatory rules in
corporate law, Hansmann's larger thesis about state-authored changes to the corporate contract
would still be plausible.
23 See id. at 9 ("[S]hareholders and managers delegate to government the task of revising
their contractual relations over time.").
24 For a critique of Delaware law on the basis that it changes regularly, see William J.
Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 16-17 ("The important observation here is not that the rules are difficult to discern
once announced, but that new rules have been announced with remarkable regularity.").
25 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). On the Smith v. Van Gorkom case as a change in the law, see
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 131
(1988) ("The outcome of the case was exactly opposite to what virtually every observer of
Delaware law would have predicted.").
26 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). On Stone v. Ritter as a change in the duty of loyalty, see, for
example, Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 559, 595-98 (2008) (contending that Stone reinterpreted the duty of care in the
Caremark case so that it involved the duty of good faith); Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of
Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 470 (2009) (indicating that the Stone
decision "reordered the roles of good faith and loyalty"); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell,
Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1778 (2007)
("[Wihat had been generally understood to be an instance of the duty of care... [the Caremark
doctrine] became officially an instance of the duty of loyalty."). It should be noted that others
believe Stone v. Ritter confirmed the pre-existing content of fiduciary duties in Delaware law.
See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 633 (2010) (suggesting that Stone was "an important but,
ultimately, mundane and unsurprising decision").
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DYNAMIC FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In another sense, fiduciary duties may be dynamic based on their
context-dependent nature. Particular duties of loyalty, for example, may
apply to corporations when they are closely held, and these duties may
then shift when the corporation becomes publicly held.27 Of course, we
might not think this is really a form of dynamism. Instead, this context-
dependency could be seen as the result of a static but fact-specific legal
standard. The legal doctrine is arguably the same, while the applications
of that doctrine vary.28 Even so, commentators sometimes view this
adaptability as a form of dynamism, and sensitivity to context is an
important feature of fiduciary duties.29
This Article suggests a third sense in which fiduciary duties are
dynamic. It will not focus on legislated or judicially-imposed changes to
legal doctrine; nor will it address those cases where the legal doctrine of
fiduciary duties is sensitive to changing corporate conditions. Instead,
this Article is concerned with the ways in which fiduciary duties change
when boards of directors revise their interpretation of fiduciary
beneficiaries. This type of dynamism differs from the above categories,
for it is a product of directors' own interpretive choices.
In order to see how directors are able to make such changes to
fiduciary duties, it will help to start with the business judgment rule.
This is the standard legal presumption that "in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company."30 As a result of the business judgment rule,
directors have a tremendous amount of discretion with respect to the
management of a corporation's business affairs. The business judgment
27 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 139 (2008) (describing a scenario where "the appropriate default rule on
corporate opportunities changes as the corporation grows from closely held to publicly held"). I
have some doubts concerning Elhauge's particular account of changing fiduciary duties, but it
provides a good example of the type of theory under discussion. Another context in which
fiduciary duties have sometimes been thought to shift with changes in the corporation's
condition is when it nears or enters insolvency. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon
Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1512
(1993) (describing this perspective). Delaware courts, however, have now indicated that
directors do not owe fiduciary duties directly to creditors, even when the corporation is in
insolvency. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103
(Del. 2007).
28 For an example of this perspective, see Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 2, at 763
("What may change over time is the circumstantial and contextual backdrop against which the
duties of the board of directors and those of individual directors are viewed.").
29 See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 27, at 138-39. There is also another possibility. Events that
occur after a contractual relationship is created may change the legal interpretation of that
relationship. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2001). Some jurisdictions' law of close corporations applies this
type of approach by taking into account changes in the parties' reasonable expectations (and
thus arguably rendering fiduciary duties dynamic).
30 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
2012]
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
rule contains important exceptions in self-dealing situations and in
contexts where self-dealing is considered likely.31 But once we depart
from those limited exceptions, the rule provides expansive protections.
In prior work, I have argued that the business judgment rule allows
courts and other legal actors to reach an incompletely theorized
agreement. 32 Incompletely theorized agreements involve a consensus on
desirable outcomes in the absence of agreement on the high-level theory
that supports those outcomes. 33 In the legal setting, this type of
agreement can be a very useful means to resolve cases when judges
differ in their judicial philosophy, or otherwise fail to share the same
foundation for their legal reasoning.
Courts and commentators may differ on the purpose of fiduciary
duties at a high level of generality, while reaching agreement on the
business judgment rule as an appropriate doctrine. Whether one is a
supporter of the shareholder primacy, director primacy, or team
production models, a strong business judgment rule will make sense 34
Even if one thinks that boards should consider non-corporate
constituencies-such as the public interest-there may still be reason to
support a protective business judgment rule.35 The business judgment
rule thus allows courts to resolve fiduciary litigation without reaching a
definitive resolution of core corporate law debates.
The difficulty is that, on an individual basis, directors still must
reach an answer as to which party or parties they owe fiduciary duties.
Many loyalty cases implicate a non-self-dealing rule-but many other
cases require a choice among beneficiaries.36 If directors are attempting
to wealth maximize, they must figure out whose wealth they will
maximize. These questions, moreover, will present themselves even if
directors conclude that they owe their fiduciary duties to the
31 See Gold, supra note 6, at 433 ("Traditionally, the way for plaintiffs to get around this
presumption was to allege fraud, illegality, or a conflict of interest. Otherwise, a plaintiff would
have to demonstrate that the board's decisions did not have a rational basis-i.e., that there is
no possibility of a legitimate business purpose.").
32 Id. at 435. On the general concept of incompletely theorized agreements, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995).
33 Sunstein, supra note 32.
34 For an analysis from the director primacy perspective, see Bainbridge, supra note 18, at
602-03. For an analysis from the team production perspective, see Blair & Stout, supra note 3,
at 299-303.
35 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 770 (2005) ("[T]he business judgment rule makes plain that the duty of care cannot be
enforced in a way that would bar managers from exercising discretion to sacrifice corporate
profits in the public interest.").
36 For those cases which solely implicate a rule against self-dealing, the questions at issue in
this article will fade into the background. Cf. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm,
23 J. CORP. L. 277, 284 (1998) ("Some applications of the fiduciary principle in corporate law do
not require the identification of any particular corporate constituency as beneficiary, but only
that the interests of 'the corporation' in general must be served.").
[Vol. 34:491
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shareholders alone. Shareholders also have a very wide range of
potentially diverging interests.37 On this type of question, however, the
judiciary and legislature have provided little in the way of guidance.38
The scope of appropriate director conduct will vary depending on
one's chosen theory of corporate law. For example, under the classic
shareholder primacy theory, directors are viewed as agents of the
shareholders.39 From this perspective, directors understandably are
thought to owe a duty to maximize shareholder wealth. In contrast, the
director primacy view rejects the idea that directors are agents of the
shareholders. They are instead in a sui generis category, managing the
corporation according to their best judgment.40 But as developed by its
proponents, director primacy is also thought to support a shareholder
wealth maximization norm. 41 For team production theorists, however,
directors are supposed to be neutral mediating hierarchs42 They make
sure that each corporate constituent receives adequate returns in light of
their participation in the corporate endeavor.43 Shareholder wealth
maximization is no longer a mandate.
Interpretive choices will exist under each of these theories. If one
adopts a team production approach, directors are given room to decide
whether to favor non-shareholder constituents or shareholders.44 Even
under a shareholder primacy approach, directors have substantial
37 See Anabtawi, supra note 4, at 578-92.
38 For these purposes, the lack of judicial guidance is notable, since there is no external
consensus on the matter. This lack of guidance may in part be a product of the business
judgment rule, which permits courts to resolve cases without always delineating clear standards
of conduct. Cf. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1309, 1323 (2008) ("The business judgment rule, however, is an awkward tool for giving
directors the legal guidance they need to make good decisions."). That said, the presence of the
business judgment rule does not render irrelevant judicial guidance (or lack of guidance) on
fiduciary standards of conduct. Or at least not if, as Baird and Henderson note, many directors
"want to do what they are supposed to do." Id. In addition, judicial pronouncements can matter
for directors with distinct motivations. Judicially described standards of conduct can have a
significant impact on social norms, and these norms may be internalized by individual
directors. See Gold, supra note 26, at 518-21; Gold, supra note 15, at 1101-03. Directors who do
not follow standards of conduct simply because they are legally obligatory may still follow those
standards for other reasons.
39 See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder
Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 268-69 (2001) (describing the
agency view).
40 For examples of the director primacy view, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of
Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002); Bainbridge, supra note 18. On the sui
generis status of directors, see id. at 550-51.
41 See Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 550 (supporting shareholder wealth maximization
under a director primacy approach).
42 See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 276-87.
43 Id. at 286 (suggesting that directors "should be viewed as disinterested trustees charged
with faithfully representing the interests not just of shareholders, but of all team members").
44 Id. at 296 (suggesting a judicial perception that directors' fiduciary duties "go beyond a
simple duty to maximize shareholder wealth, and encompass the interests of a variety of other
corporate constituencies").
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interpretive freedom. The Delaware courts have made it clear that it is
up to directors to figure out which time horizons to adopt for purposes
of their business decisions.4s They have also left it open to directors to
decide whether to favor shareholders who are diversified or
undiversified; shareholders who are hedged or unhedged; shareholders
who are risk-averse or risk-neutral; shareholders who are affiliated or
unaffiliated with the corporation.46
The practical implications of this very broad grant of director
discretion-to act on behalf of the shareholders and the corporation-
are thus significant. Different directors are likely to reach substantially
different conclusions as to precisely whom they owe fiduciary duties.
Variations will certainly emerge. The striking feature, however, is the
resulting tendency toward dynamism. It is not merely that multiple
interpretations of fiduciary beneficiaries are possible, but that these
interpretations will change over time.
As old directors are replaced by new directors-whether through
retirements or removal-the directors' internal judgments of the proper
fiduciary beneficiary are likely to shift. And as directors themselves
change their views-whether through increased experience or other
psychological processes-their internal judgments will also shift.
Furthermore, if directors believe they are accountable to the views of the
current corporate polity, then changes in shareholders, creditors, and
employees will also bring about changes in director views.47 The end
result is that there is an inevitable revision of fiduciary duties over time,
as directors alter their interpretations regarding the target of their
fiduciary conduct.
These outcomes could be explained as a matter of chance. Dynamic
fiduciary duties may be the accidental result of the business judgment
rule, combined with certain pragmatic judicial choices. Some suggest
that judicial ambivalence plays a role in the uncertainty of fiduciary
beneficiaries.48 Perhaps courts are compromising between conflicting
and irreconcilable visions of good corporate governance. 49 In addition,
45 See Paramount Commc'ns v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) ("[Dlirectors,
generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without
regard to a fixed investment horizon."); see also Gold, supra note 6, at 437 ("Directors
effectively get to pick which shareholder time horizons to favor in their corporate strategy.");
Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV.
277, 308-13 (1990) (discussing the Paramount decision in the context of judicial efforts to
provide directors with discretion regarding appropriate time horizons).
46 See Gold, supra note 6, at 437-38 (noting ambiguity as to which shareholders boards
should seek to benefit).
47 This is because the composition of the current polity is frequently changing. In contrast,
if directors feel that they should focus on the original polity when the corporation was founded,
this would likely produce a more static outcome.
48 See Bruner, supra note 8, at 1449.
49 Cf id. at 1443 (describing the view that an appropriate balance has been struck).
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courts may be using the vagueness of fiduciary doctrine instrumentally,
as a means to change legal doctrine when political pressures come into
play.50
While each of these explanations is potentially accurate, this Article
will seek a different type of theory. It will assess whether the resulting
legal doctrine is a justifiable outcome in terms of efficiency values and,
potentially, in terms of adherence to the corporate contract. From this
perspective, courts may have reason to leave a degree of uncertainty in
fiduciary law in order to permit directors some discretion in
determining the primary beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties.51
A helpful starting point is to focus on the most probable director
interpretations of their fiduciary responsibilities. In theory, there is an
indefinite number of ways in which director interpretations could
change over time. If dynamic fiduciary duties follow a particular pattern
of revision, however, this may help to justify them. Perhaps fiduciary
duties will be adjusted over time in a predictable way. If so, this pattern
of adjustment may allow us to assess whether the dynamism of fiduciary
duties is a productive part of corporate doctrine.
One possibility is that directors' judgments about appropriate
corporate beneficiaries will track changes in bargaining power among
corporate constituencies. Directors' fiduciary duties may amount to a
bargain-mimicking default-i.e., a default that reflects allocations of
bargaining power among the contracting parties. This possibility will be
discussed in Part II below.
II. BARGAIN-MIMICKING DEFAULTS IN CORPORATE LAW
From the leading economic perspective, the corporation is a nexus
of contracts, and the corporate charter and bylaws are contractual in
nature.52 These contractual relations are thought to have a variety of
gaps, and courts provide default content to fill those gaps when the
parties are silent. Fiduciary duties are a prominent example of such a
50 Cf. Griffith, supra note 10, at 7-8 (analyzing the fiduciary duty of good faith in similar
terms). More generally, commentators have suggested that indeterminacy in corporate law can
play a role in Delaware's competition with other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A
Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908
(1998).
51 It should be noted that efficiency values and contractual norms are not the only values
which might provide such a justification. For example, Seana Shiffrin has recently developed an
account of legal vagueness which suggests that, under certain circumstances, vagueness can
induce a desirable form of moral deliberation. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral
Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (2010). Quite possibly
directors would be encouraged to engage in this moral deliberation in determining the proper
objectives of their fiduciary conduct. See Gold, supra note 15, at 1104-06 (discussing the
relevance of Shiffrin's account to the vagueness of fiduciary beneficiaries in corporate law).
52 See Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 552-53 (describing the "nexus of contracts" model).
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gap-filler. In addition, the now prevailing view of directors' fiduciary
duties-and of many other corporate law doctrines-is that they are
majoritarian default terms. 53 That is, they are default terms that the
majority of corporate actors would select ex ante in a world of zero
transaction costs. 54
Within this rubric, there are substantial differences of opinion
about the purpose of the firm and the various legal rules which regulate
the firm. As noted, some scholars take a shareholder primacy view,
while others take a director primacy view. 55 Team production theories
have also gained currency in recent years.56 Yet there are common
features to each approach. Generally speaking, a majoritarian approach
is dominant as a starting point, and these theories then offer distinctive
understandings of what this majoritarian outlook requires.
On the other hand, while corporate law is replete with majoritarian
default rules, it plausibly contains default rules of varying types. In
particular contexts, corporate law may make use of tailored defaults,57
penalty defaults,58 sticky defaults,-s9 or muddy defaults.60 Defaults may
also be designed to take into account the evolution of corporate law.61
Each of these variants has its proponents, and when courts fill gaps in
the corporate contract, they may draw on each of these defaults.
This Part suggests that an additional approach could be operating
in corporate law-a bargain-mimicking approach. In a recent paper,
Omri Ben-Shahar has argued that this type of default approach helps us
53 For a leading economic account of fiduciary duties in this vein, see Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993).
54 Id. at 426.
55 The meaning of the shareholder primacy category is somewhat ambiguous. However, it
often incorporates the view that shareholders are the owners of the corporation, that they have
ultimate control over the corporation, and that directors owe fiduciary duties to maximize
wealth for the shareholder class. For an argument that this is a consensus position in corporate
law, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439-40 (2001). For a discussion of the director primacy view, see generally Bainbridge,
supra note 18.
56 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 3.
57 On tailored defaults and their relation to corporate fiduciary duties, see Mariana
Pargendler, Modes of Gap Filling: Good Faith and Fiduciary Duties Reconsidered, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1315 (2008).
58 On penalty defaults, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); see also Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999).
59 On sticky defaults in corporate law, see Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering
Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383 (2007).
60 On muddy defaults in the law of business organizations, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Contractarianism in the Business Associations Classroom: Kovacik v. Reed and the Allocation of
Capital Losses in Service Partnerships, 34 GA. L. REV. 631, 651-52 (2000); see also Jill E. Fisch,
The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1061, 1081-85 (2000) (describing use of muddy rules in corporate law).
61 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 489 (2002).
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to understand certain features of contract law. The idea of a bargain-
mimicking default may also help us to understand the fiduciary
beneficiaries puzzle. The Section below will begin by explaining what a
bargain-mimicking default is, and how it may be justified in some
settings.
A. The Contractual Theory of Bargain-Mimicking Defaults
Bargain-mimicking defaults differ from the ordinary contractual
default in that, when adopting them, courts are not necessarily seeking
to maximize the joint surplus stemming from a contract. Courts are
instead seeking a gap-filler that will reflect the relative bargaining power
of the contracting parties. This means, in some cases, favoring the
stronger party. But while that outcome might sound counter-intuitive,
under the right circumstances the approach may be a reasonable one.
As Ben-Shahar notes, "[t]he most broadly accepted principle of
gap-filling is that courts should 'mimic the parties' will.'"62 In the typical
gap-filling case, there is no will as such to be followed. In addition, we
do not generally know the precise terms to which the individual parties
would have consented. In light of these realities, courts infer a
hypothetical will.63 From this perspective, courts often assume that the
parties would have opted for the most efficient terms. Or, as Ben-Shahar
puts it: "Assuming parties are rational, they would have agreed upon
terms that maximize their joint surplus, irrespective of the distributive
impact of such terms."64
In order for a surplus-maximizing approach to work, Ben-Shahar
suggests that there must be a surplus-neutral term (typically, the price
term).65 Yet it is possible for a contract to have a gap with respect to this
surplus-neutral term. With respect to these surplus-neutral contract
terms, Ben-Shahar accordingly suggests that we depart from the
surplus-maximizing principles usually applied to fill gaps. 66 Where these
surplus-neutral terms are at stake, the parties' interests will often
diverge-there may be no jointly shared preferences that we can
62 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 396 (quoting Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General
Theories, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 3-4 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
De Geest eds., 2000)).
63 See id. ("Of course, the notion of the parties' will is hypothetical. Because the contract
contains a gap, we do not know what they would have consented to.").
64 Id. at 397.
65 See id.
66 See id. ("[T]he surplus-maximizing conception of gap filling is, by definition, insufficient
to resolve all gaps because it does not resolve gaps in the price term or in any other contract
term that is purely distributive.").
2012]
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
hypothesize.67 Ben-Shahar thus argues that we need a different kind of
default rule to address these gaps.
In such cases, it is arguable that we can still respect the parties'
agreement.68 A common justification for the standard hypothetical
bargain methodology is that it reflects the terms that most similarly
situated parties would have agreed upon, and this can be helpful
information as to what the specific parties before the court would have
done. A bargain-mimicking default can be justified on similar grounds.
As Ben-Shahar explains:
In the case of distributive terms, the parties do not have a joint
interest, ex ante.... The argument, therefore, is that the central
conception of what the joint will is must be supplemented by a
criterion that would apply to settings that are purely distributive.
Fortunately, courts often have information that can help them tease
out what the parties would have agreed upon: information about the
parties' relative bargaining power. 69
In other words, the principle that we should seek terms that the
parties would have selected underpins both the standard majoritarian
hypothetical bargain analysis, as well as the bargain-mimicking analysis.
The aim is to provide terms that the parties would have arrived at, if
they had addressed the issue.70
The next Section of this Article will consider whether corporate
fiduciary law presently includes bargain-mimicking defaults. We might
question a bargain-mimicking justification for dynamic fiduciary duties
if bargain-mimicking were unheard of in corporate law. In fact, there
are fiduciary cases which suggest that courts have already adopted a
bargain-mimicking default. The clearest example occurs in
circumstances where weaker investors attempt to disempower an
investor with greater bargaining power. Thus, at least in the abstract, it
is plausible to apply the approach to dynamic fiduciary duties.
67 See id. ("[Tihe existence of a gap in a contract is often an indication that a consensus
could not be reached because a single jointly preferable term does not exist.").
68 This is not to say that a court-provided gap-filler is the same as a term that the parties
actually consented to. It may, however, be the next best thing to a term that the parties actually
consented to.
69 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 404.
70 If Ben-Shahar is correct on the hypothetical bargain justification for a bargain-mimicking
approach, it is possible that this justification would supersede the interest in adopting
majoritarian default rules. For a suggestion along these lines, see Shawn J. Bayern, The Limits of
Bargaining Power as an Interpretive Aid 2 n.11 (Fla. St. Univ. Coil. of Law, Public Law Research
Paper No. 381, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1430704. Although that concern is a significant one, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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B. Application to the Corporate Setting
As indicated above, corporate law, for the most part, follows a
majoritarian gap-filing strategy. Yet it is not hard to find default rules
in corporate law that follow a bargain-mimicking approach. The
bargain-mimicking terminology is admittedly novel, but the reader need
not conclude that this approach is inconsistent with settled principles of
corporate law. To the contrary, corporate law plausibly includes a
variety of default rule categories, and the bargain-mimicking approach
is a recognizable example.71
Consider the case of Adlerstein v. Wertheimer.72 In that case, Mr.
Adlerstein had founded a corporation, Spectrumedix. Adlerstein
encouraged two other individuals, Wertheimer and Mencher, to join the
enterprise, and Wertheimer and Mencher were both elected to the
board.y3 The firm, however, suffered a liquidity crisis. Adlerstein helped
address this crisis by providing financial support. This support also
came at a price. After loaning Spectrumedix $500,000, Adlerstein was
provided a convertible note which could be converted into stock with
80,000 votes per share. Based on a partial conversion of this note,
Adlerstein then controlled 73.27% of the voting power of the
corporation.74
Over time, the corporation ran into further difficulty, and
Wertheimer and Mencher became convinced that Adlerstein was
harming the business substantially. Adlerstein had been accused of
sexual harassment of an employee, and Wertheimer and Mencher also
believed that he had been giving inaccurate information to the board.75
It was apparent to Wertheimer and Mencher that the firm was in serious
trouble.76 In response to these concerns, Wertheimer and Mencher
contacted Ilan Reich, an investor with experience in turning around
distressed corporations.77 Reich was interested in investing if he could
take charge of the company. 78 Given Adlerstein's dominant voting
rights, Wertheimer and Mencher needed to find a way to give control to
Reich. Wertheimer and Mencher discussed with Reich whether
Adlerstein could be fired as CEO.79
71 That said, one might conclude that the bargain-mimicking approach, when it is used in
these cases, is used for majoritarian reasons.
72 No. CIV.A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002).
73 See id. at *1.
74 See id. at *2.
75 See id. at *2-3.
76 See id. at *3.
77 See id. at *4-5.
78 See id, at *4.
79 See id. at *5.
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In order to bring about a shift in control of the firm, a board
meeting was necessary. Adlerstein allegedly called a board meeting at
the urging of Wertheimer and Mencher, but was not told of their plan to
shift control to Reich.80 At this meeting, Wertheimer and Mencher
voted to remove Adlerstein for cause from his office as CEO, and to
have the corporation issue sufficient numbers of super-voting shares to
Reich such that he gained voting control.81 Following the meeting, Reich
then voted his shares by written consent to remove Adlerstein from the
board of directors.82
Adlerstein sued, claiming that the board meeting was invalid, and
that the events which occurred at that board meeting were in violation
of Wertheimer and Mencher's fiduciary duties. The Delaware Chancery
Court concluded that the board meeting was validly called,83 but it held
that Wertheimer and Mencher had violated their fiduciary duties by
implementing their scheme in secret.84
As the court noted, Adlerstein possessed the contractual power to
block the issuance of the super-voting shares to Reich.85 Given his
voting power as a shareholder, he could remove Wertheimer or
Mencher from the board, effectively barring their plan from success. He
was prevented from exercising this power by the fact that the agenda for
the board meeting had not been shared with him beforehand. The court
indicated that a shareholder or director is ordinarily not entitled to such
an agenda, but found that as a director and controlling shareholder,
Adlerstein's situation was different.86 Indeed, the court emphasized that
the hidden conduct at issue was improper even if it was designed to
"save the company."87
Under a number of theories, the Adlerstein case is hard to explain.
It has been suggested that the court's decision conflicts with both
director primacy and team production theories of corporate law.88
Arguably, Wertheimer and Mencher were choosing a path that would
80 See id. at *5-6.
81 See id. at *6-7.
82 See id. at *7.
83 See id. at *8.
84 See id. at *11-12.
85 See id. at *9.
86 See id. at *9 n.28 ("The outcome in this case flows from the fact [that] Adlerstein was
both a director and a controlling stockholder, not from either status individually.").
87 See id. at * 11.
88 See Charles R.T. O'Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation,
31 J. CoRp. L. 753, 774-76 (2006). Other (non-bargain-mimicking) explanations are available.
Charles O'Kelley offers an entrepreneur-based theory, for example. See id. at 776-77. The
Adlerstein case may also be explained under a particular conception of loyalty. See Gold, supra
note 26, at 483 n.130. In addition, it is conceivable that Adlerstein can be squared with the
leading standard accounts of fiduciary duties and corporate law. For example, Adlerstein is
possibly consistent with a shareholder-primacy view. Its reasoning is nonetheless not an
obvious outcome of that approach.
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serve the best interests of the shareholders, and also the corporation. But
despite an absence of conflicting interests, their choice did not receive
judicial deference. The driving force of the court's opinion was focused
elsewhere. The court was concerned with the position of power which
Adlerstein held-he had the ability to stop the plot if he had known
about it, and this power to halt Wertheimer and Mencher's scheme
made all the difference.89
Although the Adlerstein case may be difficult to square with
standard accounts, it is understandable as an application of a bargain-
mimicking default. Fiduciary duties, on this account, are filling a gap
with terms that reflected Adlerstein's relative bargaining power in
comparison to the other corporate constituencies. And, while the
Adlerstein-type fact pattern is not common, the case is not sui generis.
In similar contexts, the Delaware courts have applied the same basic
doctrine.90
We can thus see that courts, at least sometimes, apply bargain-
mimicking defaults to corporate problems, in effect favoring stronger
parties within the corporate polity.91 A bargain-mimicking approach is
not foreign to corporate law. Well-established precedents adopt the
basic framework. It is a separate question whether the dynamism of
fiduciary duties can also be explained as a bargain-mimicking default.
1. The Problem in Calculating Bargaining Power
Cases like Adlerstein present relatively clear allocations of
bargaining power, but in other cases these allocations will be hard to
determine. Should courts attempt to provide a bargain-mimicking
default, a crucial challenge is to figure out how such an approach could
function accurately. Bargain-mimicking defaults require courts to assess
highly difficult questions of bargaining power. Inquiries into bargaining
power require courts to address often obscure relations among the
parties, with substantial limits to both information and judicial
expertise.
89 See Adlerstein, 2002 WL 205684, at *9 n.28 (discussing the significance of Adlerstein's
role as both a director and controlling shareholder).
90 See, e.g., Koch v. Steam, Civ. A. No. 12515, 1992 WL 181717 (Del. Ch. July 28, 1992); see
also VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000) (applying
similar doctrine in an LLC setting).
91 In considering this possibility, we might query whether a bargain-mimicking term should
reflect ex ante or ex post allocations of bargaining power. These are different types of bargain-
mimicking. As Ben-Shahar indicates, moreover, some contracts may be designed ex ante so that
ex post shifts in bargaining power will affect the terms of the contractual relationship. See Ben-
Shahar, supra note 17, at 413-15 (suggesting that parties may use a "technique of one-sided, ex
post control over a term to create what is effectively a bargain-mimicking, gap-filling regime").
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The difficulty in assessment is great for ordinary contracts, and it
may seem insurmountable in the corporate context. If courts are
inquiring after the fact, how can they reconstruct the relative bargaining
power of multiple corporate constituencies? If they can somehow make
that determination, how expensive and time consuming an adjudicative
process would be required? Given that bargaining power is not publicly
advertised, the task could be extremely difficult. In fact, it sounds like
the type of inquiry that courts would routinely get wrong.
In the contract setting, Ben-Shahar provides several responses to
this challenge. For one, he suggests that "implementing a regime with
error, or only in those cases where the parameter is verifiable, is better
than nothing."92 This point presumably depends on the court's error
rate, as well as the degree of error when mistakes occur.93 But even so,
there are surely cases in which determining relative bargaining power
should not be hard. As Ben-Shahar indicates, "someone who sells a good
for which demand is inelastic undeniably possesses greater bargaining
power than those with whom she is negotiating."94
In addition, courts are likely familiar with bargaining power
inquiries. While we may not traditionally think of courts in the bargain-
mimicking role, they are often called upon to consider relative
bargaining power. Ben-Shahar notes that the unconscionability
doctrine, for example, often takes into account whether there was one-
sided bargaining power. 95 Bargaining power can be a significant issue in
duress cases, and it is relevant to the contra proferentum principle.96
Ben-Shahar concludes: "a substantial doctrinal tradition is... founded
on the belief that courts can identify bargaining power and determine
legal consequences based on this identification."97
Granting these arguments, it is not clear that they carry over to the
standard corporate context.98 How is a court to determine relative
bargaining power among a spectrum of institutional shareholders,
creditors, and other potential constituencies? Unconscionability cases
are often extreme cases. And, to the extent there is corporate precedent
for bargain-mimicking in cases like Adlerstein, these are also extreme
cases. No one could doubt Mr. Adlerstein's bargaining power. How can
92 Id. at 408.
93 It should also be noted that a default that merely gives an approximation of what the
parties would have bargained toward is not necessarily a default that the parties would consider
acceptable if they had bargained over the issue.
94 Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 408.
95 See id. at 409.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Note that we might still question these arguments in contractual settings as a general
matter, even if they resolve our concerns in particular cases. See Bayern, supra note 70, at 4-6
(questioning the reliability of a bargain-mimicking approach to contractual gap-filling).
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a court make the more subtle determinations when there are many
parties involved, and where the power relations are not so clear cut?
The problem's complexity is substantial. In practice, a bargain-
mimicking default does not mean that courts should give the more
powerful party or parties whatever they happen to want.99 In many
cases, compromises will be required, in light of the weaker parties'
strong preferences on particular subject matters. The analysis of likely
bargains thus includes highly fact-specific concerns about individual
preferences and bargaining strategy. This could make the bargain-
mimicking inquiry quite difficult, even if courts are relatively well
informed.
In addition, the powerful party may have already used its
bargaining power on a different issue from the one before the court. 00
There are also limits to what weaker parties may be willing to tolerate.
Accordingly, the mere fact that one party is stronger in bargaining
power overall does not mean it should receive its vision of the ideal
contract term. Indeed, as Ben-Shahar notes: "If the stronger party
suppressed a specific issue and deliberately left a gap, it could actually be
an indication of the limits of her bargaining power." 101
When assessing relative bargaining power, courts should also
recognize that parties may have bargaining power in different areas. 102
This can create substantial complexity in the corporate arena. Creditors,
for example, may have significant bargaining power when issues arise
that relate to specific terms in their debt agreement. They may have
increased influence when the corporation is in financial difficulty.
Creditors may have much less bargaining power when a business
decision is not plausibly covered by the debt agreement. In light of the
quantity of constituencies involved in corporate fact patterns, these are
not minor challenges for a court to resolve.
2. The Board as an Estimator of Bargaining Power
A potential answer to these accuracy concerns emerges when we
consider an analogous setting. In the statutory interpretation setting,
courts sometimes apply what amounts to a bargain-mimicking default
for unclear statutes.103 In Einer Elhauge's phrase, courts apply a "current
99 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 409-10 (noting that some gaps may reflect limits of a
stronger party's bargaining power).
100 See id. at 410.
101 Id. at 410.
102 Id. at 419 (describing this possibility in the insurance contract setting).
103 For a discussion of these default rules, see generally ELHAUGE, supra note 27.
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preferences default."104 This default seeks to fill statutory gaps by
looking to the currently enactable preferences of the legislature. A
current preferences default rule is effectively a bargain-mimicking
default rule based on the present-day bargaining power of legislative
and executive actors. 105
As with corporations, legislatures present serious challenges for a
court that would seek to assess allocations of bargaining power. How
can courts know which members of Congress would get their way?
Given the complexities of legislative decision-making, coalition-based
votes, and also presidential vetoes, current-preferences defaults for
statutes seem just as challenging to implement as bargain-mimicking
defaults for contracts. A potential answer to this challenge is to use
another legal institution to address hard cases.
In the statutory setting, courts do not always need to fill statutory
gaps, as agencies do much of the gap-filling. Indeed, under Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 106 courts must often
defer to agency interpretations of unclear statutes. Where the statutory
meaning is clear, courts apply that statutory meaning. Where that
meaning is ambiguous or vague, courts generally defer to the relevant
agency's interpretation of the statute's meaning. As a consequence, a
very large number of federal statutes are effectively interpreted by
agencies rather than the judiciary.
The Chevron doctrine can be explained in several ways. For
example, it may be understood as a separation of powers-based
doctrine, or it may reflect a judgment that agencies have greater policy
expertise than courts.107 Elhauge suggests that we can explain this
allocation of authority on a different basis. From his perspective, the
Chevron doctrine is a straightforward mechanism to estimate enactable
legislative preferences. In Elhauge's view: "[Chevron] proves easy to
explain if courts are.. . applying default rules that track reliable
indications of current enactable preferences, because decisions by
current agencies normally provide such an indication, given the
agencies' political accountability." 108
On this view, agencies are likely to be responsive to currently
enactable preferences. 109 As Elhauge notes, agency heads are selected by
104 See id. at 9-10 (using this phrase to describe defaults that track the preferences of the
current legislative polity).
105 Indeed, Ben-Shahar notes this fact. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 430.
106 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
107 For a helpful discussion of different theories regarding the Chevron doctrine, see Thomas
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 863-73 (2001).
108 ELHAUGE, supra note 27, at 79.
109 The key question, however, is a comparative one. The question is not whether agencies
are ideally responsive to currently enactable preferences, but whether their decisions are more
likely to reflect those preferences than the decisions of courts.
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the President and confirmed by the Senate, in significant part based on
the acceptability of their policy views.,lo Once confirmed, agency heads
are supervised by the executive, and legislative committees provide
further oversight.1 Agency heads also serve for limited terms, and
agencies benefit from ex parte contacts with affected parties.112 Elhauge
concludes: "The policy views that govern the actions of agency heads
thus generally come about as close to being a barometer of current
political preferences as we can get."113
We may or may not agree that Elhauge has captured the rationale
of the Chevron doctrine. But notice that the structure of Elhauge's
Chevron argument can be applied to other settings in which courts may
wish to address allocations of bargaining power. Indeed, the argument is
particularly suggestive for the corporate setting. Non-judicial
institutions may be available for bargain-mimicking purposes even if we
have significant doubts that courts are well-suited for the task, and
boards of directors could plausibly serve this function. 114
For present purposes, the relation of courts to boards is similar to
the relation of courts to agencies under the Chevron doctrine.11s In the
corporate context, courts are in a poor position to figure out the shifting
allocations of bargaining power among corporate constituencies. Even
so, many gaps in the corporate contract are filled by a party that should
know current preferences among corporate constituencies quite well:
the board of directors.116 Director decisions may reflect these
preferences. In turn, the dynamism of fiduciary duties may reflect
changes in power among corporate constituencies.
Given the various ways in which corporate constituencies can
benefit (or suffer) from board discretion, it makes sense to expect that
these constituencies will seek influence over board decisions. These
110 See ELHAUGE, supra note 27, at 80.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 82.
113 Id. at 80. There are also practical features of judging which make it likely that agencies
will be superior at assessing current preferences in a large run of cases. Judges are often
appointed years prior to the relevant dispute, and may not be well-positioned to know the
current bargaining power of legislative actors. See id. at 81.
114 Note that this idea may be helpful for present purposes even if we reject Elhauge's
account in the statutory setting. Elhauge's theory has come under substantial criticism as an
approach to statutory default rules. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Preferences, Laws, and
Default Rules, 122 HARV. L. REv. 2104 (2009) (reviewing ELHAUGE, supra note 27).
115 This is not to deny that statutory contexts are very different from corporate contexts in
other respects. As Elhauge notes, we may not expect legislators to have the same preferences for
efficient default rules that we would expect in corporate contexts. See ELHAUGE, supra note 27,
at 5-6.
116 For a suggestion that corporate charters provide a default rule under which boards fill in
what would otherwise be contractual gaps, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling




efforts to obtain influence will have an effect, at least some of the time.
In fact, constituent pressure is often thought to play a role in director
judgments. As Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout suggest, "the returns to
any particular corporate stakeholder from participating in the
corporation will be determined not only by market forces, but by
political forces."117
There are also many opportunities for investors and other
corporate constituencies to influence directors. Unlike the judicial
context, where ex parte contacts are a problem, significant investor
contacts with directors are often acceptable (assuming no insider
trading or related concerns).118 Furthermore, as institutional
shareholders have grown in strength, the similarities to lobbying in the
legislative arena have also grown. Institutional investors may engage in
private negotiations with management. 119 In addition, shareholders may
threaten proxy contests, and precatory votes may signal the viewpoints
associated with large numbers of shares. 120
Indeed, various constituencies have bargaining power, and
regularly exercise that power. Hedge funds are often quite active with
respect to the corporations in which they invest.121 Likewise, creditors
also exert influence. Boards have changed course on business strategy
when confronted with unhappy bondholders. 122 Labor unions are often
vocal participants regarding corporate policy, and may effectively be
represented by directors on the board. 123 Naturally, different
constituencies will have greater bargaining power with respect to
different issues. In some cases, contractual rights will be directly on
point. In some cases, an issue will be of particular concern to one
constituency, and less relevant to other constituencies. But corporate
boards do not lack for signals regarding these interests.
117 Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 325.
118 For example, Regulation FD could have an impact with respect to some of these contacts.
For a discussion of that regulation and its effects, see Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1,
48-52 (2002).
119 See John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1056-57 (1993).
120 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 622 (2003) (suggesting
that precatory votes are "a means to power").
121 See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1278-79 (2008) (describing the role of hedge funds as activist investors).
122 See, e.g., HB Korenvaes Invs. v. Marriott Corp., Civ. A. No. 12922, 1993 WL 257422, at *5
(Del. Ch. July 1, 1993) (describing change to a major business transaction following bondholder
litigation).
123 Note that, in addition to the traditional sources of bargaining power held by labor
unions, they may also hold bargaining power as activist shareholders. See Stewart J. Schwab &
Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998).
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Boards are also uncannily good at winning close shareholder votes.
As Yair Listokin's work suggests, management-sponsored proposals are
much more likely to win votes by a small margin than to lose votes by a
small margin. 124 This skill in winning close votes suggests that directors
often have a reasonably accurate knowledge of where the corporate
polity stands. If nothing else, it suggests that boards have the ability to
acquire that knowledge when it matters to their own interests. 125 We not
only have indications that parties lobby boards, we also have evidence
that boards (at least some of the time) find ways to acquire accurate
information about the corporate polity.
Now, it is a separate question whether board decisions in the
relevant area will accurately reflect the parties' bargaining power. Boards
might be quite skillful at knowing how bargaining power is
disseminated among the various parties, without actually choosing to
respect that bargaining power. It is also entirely possible that bargaining
power will only be recognized in those cases where it benefits directors,
or that it will be recognized in ways that overindulge the interests of
more powerful constituencies.126 That said, given the way in which
directors are elected, their incentives will often push them in a bargain-
mimicking direction, and directors' understanding of bargaining power
among the various parties is likely to be more accurate than the
understanding of the courts. 127
Boards will not always get things right. Yet they have a comparative
advantage in accessing information, and incentives that will commonly
push them toward interpretations of their duties that favor parties with
stronger bargaining power. It is reasonable to think that their decisions
are more likely to reflect present allocations of bargaining power than
those of the judiciary. From this perspective, we can understand director
decision-making as a mechanism for providing a bargain-mimicking
default.
124 See Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 159,
161 (2008).
125 See id. at 161-62 ("The results indicate that, at some point in the voting process,
management obtains highly accurate information about the likely voting outcome and, based
on that information, acts to influence the vote.").
126 Listokin's findings could be consistent with this view. One of his conclusions is that
boards find ways to influence shareholder voting outcomes once they have acquired knowledge
about likely voting results. Id. The end result of a board's review of allocations of bargaining
power could still be self-serving, however, without being bargain- mimicking.
127 One might think that a focus on allocations of bargaining power would result in a team
production-type fiduciary outcome. But given director incentives, it is entirely possible that the
board's interpretation of its fiduciary duties will ultimately focus on shareholder interests. Cf.
Millon, supra note 19, at 1030 ("To the extent that rent allocation decisions depend on politics
rather than law, shareholders possess substantial leverage that privileges them in relation to




In both the contractual and statutory settings, the law sometimes
adopts a bargain-mimicking default. Like these other spheres, corporate
law can be at least partially understood in bargain-mimicking terms.
Cases like the Adlerstein case provide good examples. Dynamic fiduciary
duties may also fall into this category. If boards shift their interpretation
of fiduciary beneficiaries in light of shifts in allocations of bargaining
power, then the dynamism of fiduciary duties may follow a bargain-
mimicking pattern.
So far, however, this tells us little about the merits of the existing
law. Fiduciary duties are, sometimes, responsive to whichever parties
possess bargaining power respecting a potential board decision. In this
light, the dynamism of fiduciary duties can be seen as a bargain-
mimicking device. Justifying dynamic fiduciary duties on this basis is
more difficult. Part III will discuss the challenges in justifying a bargain-
mimicking approach.
III. THE MERITS OF A BARGAIN-MIMICKING APPROACH
A. Costs and Benefits
The dynamism of fiduciary duties could, in theory, reflect shifting
allocations of bargaining power. At the level of corporate policy,
however, it is hard to determine whether a bargain-mimicking approach
is desirable. To a large degree, the problem is one of empirical
uncertainty.128 The proper role (if any) for a bargain-mimicking
approach is difficult to resolve under existing data, and this is unlikely
to change in the near future.
Some of the effects of bargain-mimicking fiduciary duties can be
predicted. In certain contexts, a bargain-mimicking default should
decrease transaction costs. Ben-Shahar emphasizes this point for
ordinary contracts.129 Where there is lopsided bargaining power,
anything other than the bargain-mimicking default will often result in
an effort by the more powerful party to circumvent the judicially chosen
128 Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1189, 1201 (2002) ("Where can we search for empirical evidence on the question of
whether shareholder primacy (the property model) or director primacy (the entity model) is
the best approach to corporate governance? For now, at least, I doubt that academics can
provide a definitive answer. Whether the social losses from shareholder primacy outweigh the
social losses from allowing greater director discretion is an extraordinarily complex question.
Moreover, the answer is likely to vary from firm to firm and from one historical period to
another.").
129 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 411-13 (discussing transaction cost benefits).
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gap-filler in future cases. 30 The same point seems plausible for
corporate relationships. In such cases, parties with substantially greater
bargaining power will find ways-albeit potentially costly ways-to
bring about the types of business decisions they would receive from a
board that reflected their bargaining power at the time of its decision
making.131
Other benefits may also exist. Perhaps giving boards the flexibility
to serve a dynamic range of constituencies (whether within the
shareholder class or outside of it) would encourage investors with
valuable ideas to contribute more financing to the business.
Overinvestment in influence is a concern, but there can be cases where
investment has been limited by hold-up concerns.132 Where an
individual who would make a surplus-enhancing investment is also in a
position to develop a strong bargaining position, the ability to invest in
influence may then be desirable.,33
On the other hand, there are a variety of risks associated with
bargain-mimicking fiduciary duties. For one, the vagueness of fiduciary
beneficiaries may facilitate self-dealing. The "two masters" problem is a
substantial risk.,34 The greater the variety of time horizons,
constituencies, and shareholder interests which are available to choose
from, the more likely it is that directors can disguise a business decision
which benefits their own personal interests by arguing that it is really a
business decision made for "the corporation and its shareholders."135
130 See id. at 412 ("If the law accords a party the same terms that she could secure by explicit
(and harsh) bargaining, the party with the bargaining power need not expend the costs of
explicitly specifying these same terms."). As Ben-Shahar indicates, explicit specification will be
likely in future cases. Id. ("Perhaps even more than in other contexts, when the distribution is
at stake it is likely that the stronger party will insist on contracting around a nonmimicking gap
filler."). Another possible benefit of bargain-mimicking defaults is that the weaker party need
not be humiliated by explicitly dictated terms. Id. at 412-13.
131 The ability to avoid constant updating of terms could be a related benefit. Cf. ELHAUGE,
supra note 27, at 45 ("A current preferences default rule also has a nice side benefit. It reduces
the legislative time that would otherwise have to be spent updating statutes.").
132 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 417.
133 See id. ("If the party who makes the surplus-enhancing investment is also the one who is
in a position to make the bargaining-leverage investment, it is no longer clear that the latter
investment is a social waste.").
134 Cf STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 67 (2008) ("[Albsent clear standards, directors will be tempted to pursue their own
self-interest.").
135 In this regard, we do need to keep in mind that the business judgment rule is, for present
purposes, a given. Even if courts were to precisely describe the intended beneficiaries of
fiduciary duties, it would be possible for covert self-dealing conduct to survive scrutiny. That
said, it remains possible that the two masters problem will be greater the more potential
constituencies benefit from directors' fiduciary duties-even where liability is not at issue. This
could be the case if it is easier for directors to spin their conduct to other directors based on the
vagueness of the law. It could also be the case if directors have less reliable judgments on
fiduciary beneficiaries when they have a self-interested motive. Directors might subconsciously
choose whichever interpretation of fiduciary beneficiaries is most likely to benefit the directors.
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In addition, there is a potential problem of rent-seeking. As Iman
Anabtawi has emphasized, individual shareholders sometimes seek
private benefits from the firm, at the expense of the common interests of
all shareholders.136 The same point holds true if we consider other
corporate constituents.137 They expend funds seeking to influence the
board. Presumably, a legal policy on fiduciary duties that encourages
bargain-mimicking results could also encourage various parties to seek
to influence the board for their own private benefit.
In other words, a vaguely defined range of potential fiduciary
beneficiaries may raise influence costs. 138 One example of such costs
occurs when individual shareholders or other corporate constituents
successfully divert director decision-making for their private benefit.
But, as Anabtawi notes, influence costs may also arise when a would-be
rent seeker fails at obtaining a private benefit. For the battle over
influence is itself costly. These "squabbling costs" which result from
inter-shareholder disputes would be an undesirable outcome,139 and in
many cases these costs would be substantial.
Moreover, depending on the business decision at issue, there is
some risk that boards will lose their reputation for neutrality. As David
Millon has noted:
For the board to play a facilitating role in cultivating trust between
workers and shareholders, both parties must be willing to trust the
board itself. They must believe in its neutrality; the board must not
be perceived as acting solely or primarily on behalf of one party or
the other. 140
If the board is sufficiently overt, or sufficiently biased, in its favoring of
particular constituents, this could have undesirable side effects on the
relation between various corporate constituents. 141
And finally, there are error costs. It is quite reasonable to expect
boards to more closely reflect allocations of bargaining power than
courts do. It does not follow that boards are particularly accurate or
reliable in this role. Deviations are especially likely given that boards are
not instructed by courts to reflect allocations of bargaining power.
Board decisions may effectively reflect allocations of bargaining power,
136 See Anabtawi, supra note 4, at 575-76.
137 See Millon, supra note 19, at 1031 ("[I]f the board owes no legal duty to any corporate
constituency, everything is potentially up for grabs and everyone therefore stands to gain from
efforts to influence the board's allocation decisions-no one can afford to stand on the
sidelines.").
138 See Anabtawi, supra note 4, at 575 (defining influence costs in terms of distortions in
director decision making, and in terms of resources spent in reallocating wealth).
139 Anabtawi deserves credit for the "squabbling costs" coinage. See id. at 577.
140 See Millon, supra note 19, at 1035-36.
141 There are also other potential costs. For example, well-meaning directors might expend
significant time and effort attempting to render determinate an indeterminate set of duties.
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but they may still fail to do so with sufficient regularity or precision to
overcome the mistakes and inconsistencies which will inevitably result.
While the scope and likelihood of these various costs is unclear,
these costs are not trivial concerns. The benefits of a vague rule
respecting fiduciary beneficiaries could outweigh the costs, but this is
non-obvious. Furthermore, the overall costs and benefits are non-
obvious in an area where we are unlikely to obtain reliable empirical
data, especially in the near term. We cannot readily determine how
helpful, or harmful, the bargain-mimicking features of fiduciary duties
ultimately are. Given these concerns, the next Section of this Article will
assess a distinct, non-efficiency reason for adopting a bargain-
mimicking default.
B. Autonomy Values
Autonomy values suggest a different perspective on dynamic
fiduciary duties. 142 Ideally, the bargain-mimicking approach
approximates the hypothetical bargain of the parties in the absence of a
majoritarian outcome. In some cases, this may be the best we can do if
we wish to respect the parties' contractual choices. The majoritarian
approach might give us more than one plausible answer, or no answer at
all. Under a bargain-mimicking approach, we can still try to give the
parties the outcome they would have reached if they had bargained over
the question under dispute.
Suppose there are two business strategies which will result in the
same total benefits for a firm and its shareholders, but one strategy is
better for medium-term shareholders, and another is better for long-
term shareholders. Which one should the board choose based on its
fiduciary duties? Both outcomes may maximize wealth for the
shareholder class, but the distribution of benefits across constituencies
will vary. if the criterion is maximization of joint surplus, there is no
obvious way to decide this case. 143
For these situations, it may make sense to turn to the will of the
parties, as it would exist were they to contract over the relevant
question. As Ben-Shahar suggests in the contract setting, this idea
provides an underpinning for the standard, majoritarian analysis.144 A
142 On the potential role of autonomy values in the determination of hypothetical bargains,
see David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation,
89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1825-35 (1991). Since no actual choice was made in the case of a gap,
however, "autonomy" is used loosely here.
143 Note that even if the reader has a strong opinion about the appropriate time horizon for
board decision -making, this problem can be replicated using a variety of other distinctions
among shareholders and other constituencies.
144 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 396-97.
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bargain-mimicking approach is another means to show respect for the
parties' agreement-by seeking what their effective choice would have
been-in cases where no actual will exists or where no such will can
readily be calculated. 145
In addition, the bargain-mimicking approach accomplishes a
degree of tailoring. Corporate law primarily uses majoritarian defaults,
rather than defaults tailored to the preferences of the specific parties. A
bargain-mimicking default, in contrast, will take into account
allocations of bargaining power among the actual constituents of the
specific corporation at issue. It is particularized, rather than generic.
From this perspective, a bargain-mimicking default is a way to respect
the choices of the individual parties to the precise corporate contract at
issue. 146
Yet there are difficulties here as well. The same concerns with
director errors and scope of discretion which undercut a cost/benefit
argument will also undercut an autonomy argument. Moreover, there is
a temporal concern. It is not clear that autonomy arguments will
support a bargain-mimicking default that is tied to allocations of
bargaining power as they exist at the time of a board's decision. One
could plausibly conclude that the correct bargain-mimicking default
must take into account whatever terms the parties would have chosen at
the time the corporation was founded. Those terms may be impossible
to determine after the fact-both for courts and boards-and they could
deviate substantially from the terms which boards are likely to produce
ex post.
C. Summary
If the bargain-mimicking approach is justifiable, this is most likely
to be so in those cases where bargaining power is lopsided. Here, boards
(or courts) are in the best position to accurately determine what a
bargain-mimicking outcome would be. Likewise, this is a context in
which stronger parties are more likely to contract around any contrary,
non-mimicking default rule. This is also a context where a bargain-
mimicking default will often reflect the design of the parties ex ante.
145 Indeed, we might even conclude that the founders of a corporation intended a bargain-
mimicking approach, based on their choice to have decisions made ex post by a board strongly
susceptible to allocations of bargaining power. Cf. id. at 413-15 (discussing flexible contract
drafting designed to provide for outcomes that reflect allocations of bargaining power at a
subsequent stage). This argument is somewhat uncertain, in part because it begs the question
whether bargain-mimicking approaches are really anticipated.
146 Cf ELHAUGE, supra note 27, at 3-5 (suggesting in the statutory interpretation setting that
a preference-estimating default rule is a means for courts to be honest agents of the legislature).
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Outside this limited domain, the challenges for a bargain-
mimicking approach are daunting. True, many board decisions will
loosely correspond to allocations of bargaining power among corporate
constituents. But deviations could be common, whether they stem from
conflicting fiduciary interpretations, director error, or self-dealing. In
addition, influence costs are a significant risk. Given each of these
concerns, there is far too much uncertainty to conclude that a bargain-
mimicking default is a desirable one as an across-the-board approach. In
many cases, it is debatable whether bargain-mimicking is even a
descriptive fit for the ways in which fiduciary duties are dynamic.
IV. AN EVOLUTIONARY CASE FOR DYNAMIC FIDUCIARY DUTIES
While corporate law may provide an effective bargain-mimicking
default in certain cases, this possibility does not adequately justify the
current legal doctrine. Bargain-mimicking defaults are not necessarily
desirable, especially if we doubt whether our legal and corporate
institutions will accurately reflect allocations of bargaining power. In
addition, even within such a rubric, we must always ask which time
period is at issue. The founders of a corporation might plausibly prefer a
default which statically mimics founding era allocations of bargaining
power.147 Whether our focus is efficiency or autonomy, bargain-
mimicking is at best a debatable basis for dynamic fiduciary duties.
There is, however, another possibility. By permitting boards to fill
gaps in fiduciary duties dynamically, courts are allowing a form of legal
experimentation. They are, to use Gordon Smith's recent phrase,
providing for "laboratories of corporate governance."148 This legal
experimentation admittedly occurs against a backdrop of judicial
uncertainty. Courts will often be unaware if a particular reading of
fiduciary beneficiaries is efficient when it occurs. 149 They may
147 Cf. Garrett, supra note 114, at 2118-19 (critiquing Elhauge's account of statutory default
rules on a similar basis).
148 See D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 125, 181 (2011) (suggesting amendments to corporate law that would "facilitate private
ordering, creating laboratories of corporate governance in U.S. public corporations"). As Smith
and his co-authors suggest, one basis for having such laboratories is the reality that different
corporate governance structures will work best for different firms. See id. at 188 (grounding this
insight in transaction-cost economics). Another example of this idea can be found in Kelli
Alces's work. See Alces, supra note 6, at 278-79 (suggesting that a role for an equity trustee
would "provide[] a way to replace the state laboratories for corporate contracts with corporate
laboratories-each firm has the chance to compose the contract with the best terms for
shareholders as balanced against other corporate interests" (footnote omitted)).
149 See Baird & Henderson, supra note 38, at 1314-15. Baird and Henderson state:
Our understanding of capital structures is simply too primitive for us to do much
more than enforce the contracts that are written as best we can. The default rules we
devise-and fiduciary obligations are simply one of these-should be in service of
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nonetheless help create legal structures that enable more efficient
fiduciary duties to emerge over time.
A. The Evolutionary Account
Whichever institution fills gaps in the corporate contract-be it a
court, legislature, or board of directors-it is conceivable that it will do
so poorly. 150 It may simply select the wrong default rule. Recent work on
corporate default rules has accordingly focused on the problem of
uncertainty in determining the desired default content. From this
perspective, the concern is to select a default rule that takes into account
the possibility that legal institutions will err.151
In the corporate setting, the risk that legal institutions will err is
relatively high. As others have noted, it is very hard to assess the merits
of a shareholder wealth maximization norm as an empirical matter. 5 2 It
is similarly hard to assess the leading alternatives. And courts are
especially ill-suited to making these assessments. This Article will thus
assume judicial uncertainty as between shareholder primacy, director
primacy, and team production models of corporate law.153 It will
likewise assume that courts do not know precisely which understanding
of fiduciary beneficiaries is ideal. Dynamic fiduciary duties offer a
response to these concerns.
When we are uncertain what regulatory approach will lead to
optimal results, a policy that supports variable regulatory approaches
can be desirable.54 Different variations may work in different settings,
these contracts. Imposing duties on directors that are too rigid or too mechanical
may limit the ability of investors to create capital structures that are beyond the ken
of those writing the rules.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
150 Indeed, staunch defenders of the majoritarian hypothetical bargain approach recognize
the difficulty in determining hypothetical bargains. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 53, at
445 ("Creating hypothetical contracts is difficult. Judges have less information than the
parties.").
151 For one approach to this type of problem, see Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 61, at 492
("[W]hen public officials face significant uncertainty about which choice [of default] would be
value maximizing, a better strategy often would be to make the choice in a way designed to
facilitate change in the event that the chosen default arrangement turns out to be disfavored by
shareholders.").
152 See Stout, supra note 128, at 1201.
153 For arguments suggesting that current legal doctrine is ambiguous with respect to these
models, see generally Bruner, supra note 8, at 1421-32; and Gold, supra note 15.
154 On the merits of variation for regulatory policy, see generally Yair Listokin, Learning
Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 (2008). Experimentalist approaches to federalism
also suggest the merits of variation. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998). There are differences in the
details, however. Listokin suggests his approach would differ from experimentalist approaches
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and successes and failures can provide information for future reform.
Yet, while regulatory variation can provide opportunities for
innovation, it is not always beneficial, and can actually be harmful in
some settings.155 Given this risk, Yair Listokin has suggested two
conditions for a variation-based response to uncertainty about legal
rules: the legal rules at issue must be reversible, and we must be able to
learn about their effects. 156 Both conditions are worth considering in the
present context.
Dynamic fiduciary duties are likely to give us variation across a
spectrum of fiduciary interpretations. The reversibility concern is
limited with respect to these outcomes. It is readily possible for courts,
legislatures, or corporations themselves to revise directors' fiduciary
duties if their content proves undesirable.157 The question of learning is
more difficult. The nuances of fiduciary conduct are often difficult for
external parties to observe. But, to a degree, dynamic fiduciary duties
should produce variance that we (or at least corporations) can learn
from.
Of course, many director interpretations of their own fiduciary
duties are opaque to outsiders. Perhaps courts or legislatures will never
learn which fiduciary interpretation is optimal; the necessary data may
be too difficult to acquire. Yet there is an additional way in which
fiduciary variations can provide benefits in the corporate setting. Even if
it is difficult to accurately assess which fiduciary interpretations are ideal
for which corporations, we may benefit from fiduciary variation as a
result of evolutionary processes. 158
Armen Alchian's insights help to illustrate the basic argument.
Alchian notes that "[i]n the presence of uncertainty-a necessary
condition for the existence of profits-there is no meaningful criterion
for selecting the decision that will 'maximize profits.'"'59 Yet, we can
turn to principles of biological evolution to understand the success of
to federalism in that his argument can support trying risky policies with negative expected
values. See Listokin, supra, at 514.
155 This could be the case for a number of reasons. For example, it might be that particular
regulatory variations are quite costly because the regulations at issue are poorly conceived. Or,
it could be the case that a uniform regulatory policy will cut down on information costs or
administrative costs in a manner that outweighs the benefits of variance.
156 See Listokin, supra note 154, at 514.
157 The ability to reverse is enhanced by the flexible practice of stare decisis in Delaware. Cf
Fisch, supra note 60, at 1078 (suggesting that the Delaware Supreme Court "appears ready to
distinguish or overrule a precedent without regard to considerations of stare decisis").
158 For a prior application of evolutionary arguments to corporate law, see Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149
U. PENN. L. REV. 1735, 1757-58 (2001) ("[F]irms that successfully encourage trust among their
participants on relevant tasks can enjoy an evolutionary advantage over firms that do not.").
159 See 1 ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ARMEN ALCHIAN 5 (Daniel K. Benjamin ed., 2005).
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firms.160 From an evolutionary perspective, "those who realize positive
profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses disappear.161 An
equivalent of natural selection applies. This insight, in turn, suggests
two conclusions: "First, success (survival) accompanies relative
superiority; and, second, it does not require proper motivation but may
rather be the result of fortuitous circumstances." 162
An evolutionary understanding suggests a potential justification
for a legal system with dynamic fiduciary duties. Courts cannot
determine what will maximize profits any more than boards of
directors. Nor can courts determine which understanding of fiduciary
beneficiaries will lead firms to success. Dynamic fiduciary duties may
nevertheless allow for a healthy evolution of approaches. With sufficient
room for variation, and a long enough time horizon, more productive
approaches to fiduciary duties may gradually win out.
Variation among fiduciary interpretations arises from many
sources. Some fiduciary innovations will be the product of business
acumen; other innovations will result from pure luck.163 As with
evolution, some of the most successful innovations will occur by
accident. There are many, many corporations out there. Given a large
enough number of corporations, and a sufficiently long period of time,
it is reasonable to think that some corporations will stumble on a lucky
business strategy. This same possibility exists with respect to director
interpretations of fiduciary duties.
Imitation also plays an important role in innovation. Successful
fiduciary innovations may be adopted by other firms, especially where a
successful approach is clearly visible. And information about successful
fiduciary approaches may travel across firms even if that information is
not available to most outsiders. It is common for directors of public
corporations to serve on multiple boards. These directors may pass
along information that is otherwise difficult for firms to verify. 164 Board
160 See id. at 16 (indicating that economists "can predict the more adoptable or viable types
of economic interrelationships that will be induced by environmental change even if
individuals themselves are unable to ascertain them").
161 See id. at 6. It should be noted that an evolutionary process need not require firms to
actually fail. Directors who perceive that their business strategies could lead to failure will often
change those strategies.
162 See id. at 6-7.
163 See id. at 8-10 (discussing the possibility of luck in successful choices).
164 Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision-Making in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43 (2002). Bainbridge states:
Firms considering a joint venture need access to credible information about the
competencies and reliability of prospective partners. Almost by definition, however,
this information is asymmetrically held and subject to strategic behavior. Interlocks
between prospective partners provide both access to such information and, by
analogy to hostage taking, a credible bond of the information's accuracy.
Id. A similar point could hold true for directors who currently serve or have previously served
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minutes may not be the most transparent medium, but governance
approaches may still move from one firm to another.
In other cases, accurate information about successful approaches
will be inaccessible to outside observers.165 Yet this too can provide a
benefit. Not every imitation needs to be successful in order for useful
innovations to emerge. Some innovations occur because of failed
imitations.166 To the extent that firms do not---or cannot-precisely
learn about a desirable conception of fiduciary duties by imitation, new
conceptions will arise. These new conceptions will, in turn, offer
potential improvements.
The benefits of variation may also exist in those cases where boards
err, whether or not they are imitating other firms. Suppose, for example,
that a board is trying to provide a bargain-mimicking default. That is,
suppose the board conceives of its duties to the shareholders and
corporation in light of the allocations of bargaining power among
corporate constituents. Acting in good faith, this board could still get its
bargain-mimicking analysis wrong. A failure to accurately mimic a
hypothetical bargain could nevertheless produce a successful variation
on fiduciary duty.
Moreover, this variation-based argument holds whether or not
boards are attempting to mimic successful allocations of bargaining
power. The key component here is the dynamism of fiduciary duties.
Directors will plausibly have differing views of what it means to be loyal
to the corporation and its shareholders. Perhaps those views are
centered on shareholder wealth maximization, or perhaps they involve a
team production theory. Director views regarding the correct
beneficiary will likely change over time, and even if individual director
views are static, the composition of the board will change over time. We
could accordingly reject the bargain-mimicking theory altogether, while
still seeing benefits from dynamic fiduciary duties as a source of
variance.
Desirable innovations can even be a product of otherwise dubious
behavior.167 At times, corporate constituents try to gain private benefits
as directors or officers of a different corporation.
165 To the extent such information is available, this may provide another argument in favor
of enabling variation. In addition to directors, courts and legislatures may learn more about the
costs and benefits of distinct fiduciary approaches if director interpretations are sufficiently
varied. On the other hand, that possibility would likely face significant measurement
difficulties.
166 See ALCHIAN, supra note 159, at 13 ("Even innovation is accounted for by imitation.
While there certainly are those who consciously innovate, there are those who, in their
imperfect attempts to imitate others, unconsciously innovate by unwittingly acquiring some
unexpected or unsought unique attributes which under the prevailing circumstances prove
partly responsible for the success.").
167 Commentators have noted this type of outcome in other contexts. Larry Ribstein notes
that successful LLC statutes may emerge from an evolutionary process, even if the original
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from the firm, and in some cases constituent lobbying for private
benefits will successfully influence the board. The conduct is not
generally desirable. But despite the drawbacks, this conduct may
produce distinct interpretations of fiduciary beneficiaries. In certain
cases, these interpretations may amount to a successful variant on
corporate governance.
Quite reasonably, there are still substantial limits to acceptable
fiduciary conduct. 68 While there may be radical uncertainty as to the
ideal understanding of fiduciary beneficiaries, there is broad consensus
that certain conduct should be prohibited, at least by default. The odds
that self-dealing and corporate waste will harm shareholders and
corporations are high enough to justify these limits, even if the
alternative would create greater variation in fiduciary approaches. 169 The
range of acceptable fiduciary interpretations is thus bounded. But within
the broad range of acceptable fiduciary understandings, variations could
be productive as part of an evolutionary process.
B. Potential Evolutionary Outcomes
Given the above analysis, one might conclude that boards would
converge on a particular understanding of fiduciary beneficiaries-for
example, they might converge on a single understanding which is the
most efficient. 170 This is questionable. In theory, the ability to learn from
other corporations could lead to this result. The broad range of
acceptable fiduciary interpretations could, as a matter of practice,
narrow down to a particular understanding of fiduciary duties, or at
least narrow down to a narrow subset within that broad range. An
objective of shareholder wealth maximization might predominate, or
directors might understand their beneficiary to be the corporation as a
lobbying for those statutes was sought by interest groups. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving
Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 832 (2001) ("For example, although particular firms or interest
groups caused enactment of the first LLC and LLP statutes, these statutes are best viewed
merely as mutations that spurred evolution." (footnote omitted)). The same possibility should
apply to boards when they determine which variation of fiduciary beneficiary to adopt.
168 Similarly, final period transactions can present serious risks of director malfeasance.
Here, too, courts play a more expansive role in monitoring director interpretive choices.
169 There may nonetheless be cases where investors feel otherwise. To the extent this is so, it
is worth noting that the Delaware law of LLC's now permits parties to entirely eliminate
fiduciary duties. For further discussion of this option, see Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination
of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
123 (2006).
170 There are certainly indications that such a convergence has yet to occur, although
tendencies may exist. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 35, at 804 ("Surveys indicate that most managers
believe that they must weigh shareholder interests against those of other stakeholders."). As
Elhauge notes, "[t]o be sure, there is other evidence that managers believe their 'primary' goal
should be shareholder profits." Id.
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whole. Yet it is not clear that this type of convergence should be the
predicted result, even if corporations can readily learn from each other.
For one thing, an evolutionary process will select for comparatively
successful approaches; these may not be identical with the optimal
approach. In addition, an evolutionary process can lead to specialization
rather than convergence across all corporations. Even if there is a great
deal of successful imitation, this imitation may occur within specific
niches. Start-up firms may typically prefer one interpretation of
fiduciary beneficiaries, while established firms may prefer another.
Closely held firms may lean toward a certain type of fiduciary
relationship, in contrast to the inclinations of publicly held firms. And
in each case, there may be highly successful exceptions to the rule.
The leading theories of corporate law often focus on particular
types of corporations, or particular fact patterns. For example, team
production theorists focus on the applicability of their theory to public
corporations 171 On the other hand, the team production model may not
work as well for closely held corporations, 172 and it is debatable for firms
with controlling shareholders.173 These cases are suggestive. Each
understanding of fiduciary beneficiaries may have categories of firms or
industries for which it is well-suited, and others for which it is doubtful.
If so, we need not anticipate that boards will converge on a particular
fixed reading of fiduciary beneficiaries.
Furthermore, a less than complete convergence may be desirable
from an evolutionary perspective. The current system of vague fiduciary
duties-in keeping with the evolutionary idea-will allow for variations
that can be successful under conditions that do not presently exist. New
industries, business models, economic conditions, and types of investors
may all result in situations where a different reading within the range of
acceptable fiduciary conceptions will be preferred. The question is not
solely whether a dynamic approach will allow for evolution that
addresses today's conditions, but whether a dynamic approach will
allow for evolution that addresses tomorrow's conditions.174
171 See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 258 (critiquing alternative theories "when applied to
public corporations"). The venture capital setting may also provide examples. Stephen
Bainbridge argues that high-tech start-ups do not generally fit the team production model,
because "the entrepreneurial founders hire the first factors of production." BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 134, at 63. But he notes that "[e]quity capital may be the principal exception.... [since] it
is more accurate to say that venture capitalists hire entrepreneurs than vice versa." Id. at n.80.
172 See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable
Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 840-41 (1999) (indicating that the team
production model does not work well here because in these cases board members are also likely
to be shareholders).
173 See id. at 841-42 (noting that in such cases, the board will likely be dominated by
shareholders, to the exclusion of non-shareholder constituencies). Coates adds that a similar
problem will arise where the board is dominated by managers. See id. at 844-46.
174 Cf ALCHIAN, supra note 159, at 8 (describing a scenario in which, as circumstances
change, differing parties would be successful).
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Dynamic fiduciary duties may well lead to more efficiency in
comparison to other options, yet they need not lead to one convergent
answer. To the extent there is convergence, this convergence may occur
within particular niches. In addition, if convergence does result, it may
be temporary. The evolutionary argument for dynamic fiduciary duties
is not aimed at a particular moment in time. It is instead a response to a
problem of uncertainty spread across a very long time horizon. In some
cases, an evolutionary process could lead to convergence among
corporations. Where conditions change, that same evolutionary process
may cause divergence. Under the right conditions, both outcomes can
be worthwhile.
C. Summary
The above account is premised on substantial levels of uncertainty,
the presence of large numbers of firms, and a long time horizon. It
stands independently from the prior, bargain-mimicking account. This
evolutionary argument may have merit even if we do not think that a
bargain-mimicking approach to fiduciary duty is likely to produce
efficient outcomes. In fact, the very uncertainty which undermines the
bargain-mimicking approach for most circumstances provides a reason
to look to an evolutionary approach.
An evolutionary process may not give us perfectly efficient
fiduciary duties at any one point in time.17S What it does provide is the
potential for increasingly efficient outcomes. And, although it is still an
empirical question, this potential suggests that the dynamism of
fiduciary duties can serve a beneficial purpose. Under conditions of
great judicial uncertainty, this may be the most we can hope for.
Whatever the judicial motivations may be for leaving fiduciary
beneficiaries uncertain, the indeterminacy could be justified. 176
175 In some cases, we may even anticipate that an evolutionary process will leave a large gap
between the efficiency of directors' interpretations and an optimal understanding of fiduciary
beneficiaries. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 12 (2009) ("If the rate of change in social, economic, and technological
environments is high, however, then social evolution faces a shifting target: even if social
structures constantly evolve towards efficiency, they may at any particular point remain very far
from it."). If the economic environment is relatively static, a large gap might also arise if
fiduciary duties shift too often, or too dramatically. Directors might change desirable
interpretations before the benefits from those interpretations become apparent.
176 The above arguments should not be understood as a demonstration that the current
uncertainty regarding fiduciary beneficiaries actually is a justified practice. This is partly
because, even if an evolutionary account is technically accurate, the evolution which results
may be insignificant in its effects. And even if the benefits are significant, the costs generated by
uncertainty may swamp those benefits. Note also, that the potential benefits of an evolutionary
process may be controversial, It might be that a system of dynamic fiduciary duties benefits




At present, we confront substantial uncertainty as to the ideal
fiduciary beneficiaries in corporate law. This is not necessarily
troubling, but it is reason to be cautious before narrowing down our
range of proper fiduciary beneficiaries. If only out of prudence, it is not
surprising that courts eschew clear answers concerning the beneficiaries
of director fiduciary duties. But the existing law may also serve a further
purpose. The courts may be onto something when they obscurely state
that directors owe their fiduciary duties to "the corporation and its
shareholders."
Delaware judges may be ambivalent about the relation between
corporate law and the public good. Likewise, judges may be
compromising between rival corporate theories. Even if these claims are
correct, there may be additional reasons to have a vague legal doctrine
regarding the correct target of directors' fiduciary duties. The vagueness
of the legal doctrine will inevitably result in dynamic fiduciary duties.
Directors will interpret their duties in different ways across time and
across firms, with different understandings of fiduciary beneficiaries.
This dynamism, in turn, may be valuable.
This Article proposes two possible justifications for these dynamic
fiduciary duties. The first possibility is that dynamic fiduciary duties
effectively provide a bargain-mimicking default. On this account,
dynamic fiduciary duties are a means to fill gaps in the corporate
contract with terms that will reflect current allocations of bargaining
power among the various corporate constituencies. In theory, this may
be the best means available to respect the will of the parties given a very
complex contract and divergent corporate interests.
This understanding is most plausible in cases where there are
lopsided allocations of bargaining power. Yet a bargain-mimicking
approach is beset with problems if it is applied more broadly. For one
thing, the potential costs of this approach could readily overwhelm the
potential benefits. In appropriate cases, transaction costs might well be
lowered by a default that reflects allocations of bargaining power. But
influence costs-both in terms of successful acquisition of private
benefits, and in terms of squabbling costs-could be substantial. In
addition, while boards will quite likely have better information about
bargaining power than courts, boards are also in a position to self-deal.
Moreover, the likelihood of director error may be high enough that
alternative, it might be that shareholders as a group would benefit from, such a system, but
other corporate constituencies would do less well. Depending on one's perspective, this latter
possibility could be problematic.
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outcomes will inadequately approximate the bargain which corporate
constituents would have reached.
The second possibility is more promising. Dynamic fiduciary
duties may provide variations in approach. This, in turn, could fit a
model of corporate evolution. Under an evolutionary account, firms
with desirable innovations-including interpretations of fiduciary
duties-are more likely to survive in the long term. Whether these
innovations occur by means of wise business decisions, imitation of
others, mistakes, trial and error, or luck, dynamic fiduciary duties will
allow for a variety of options. Over time, the better interpretations may
last. And should conditions change, new fiduciary interpretations can
replace them.
Given uncertainty over which interpretation of fiduciary
beneficiaries is ideal, the current legal ambiguity may be a justifiable
doctrine. Fiduciary duties will indeed change over time as a result.
Directors will make varying choices as they gain experience, interact
with other directors, and witness shifts in the corporate polity. But
different fiduciary interpretations may also work best for particular
types of firms, for particular industries, and for particular stages in a
corporation's existence-and each of these features may change with
new economic conditions. From this perspective, even our
understanding of fiduciary beneficiaries can be seen as a matter for
business judgment.
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